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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Megan Elizabeth Hart timely appeals from the district court's order revoking
probation and withheld judgment. On appeal, Ms. Hart argues that the Idaho Supreme
Court denied her due process and equal protection when it refused to augment the
record with various transcripts she requested be added to the record on appeal.
Additionally, Ms. Hart argues that the district court abused its discretion when it imposed
excessively harsh sentences.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Ms. Hart wrote multiple checks to various businesses knowing that she did not
have the funds in her checking account to cover the amounts of the checks. (R., pp.2830, 48-49.)

Ms. Hart was charged, by information, with issuing an insufficient funds

check and grand theft. (R., pp.28-30.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, the State filed an
amended information charging Ms. Hart with two counts of issuing an insufficient funds
check, and in return, Ms. Hart pleaded guilty to both charges.

(R., pp.46-49, 55.)

Thereafter, the district court entered a withheld judgment and placed Ms. Hart on
probation. (R., pp.55-58.)
After a period of probation, the State filed a motion for bench warrant for a
probation violation alleging that Ms. Hart had violated the terms of her probation
agreement. (R., pp.70-71.) Ms. Bates admitted to violating the terms of her probation
by failing to complete community service and failing to pay for public defender services.
(R., pp.70-71, 103.) The district court revoked probation and imposed two consecutive
indeterminate sentences of three years for each conviction. (R., pp.104-105.) Those

1

sentences were also ordered to run consecutive to a sentence in an unrelated matter. 1
(R., p.105.) Ms. Hart timely appealed. (R., pp.108-110.)
On appeal, Ms. Hart filed a motion to augment the record with various transcripts.
(Motion to Augment, pp.1-3.) The State objected, in part, to Ms. Hart's request for the
transcripts.

(Objection to "Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule

and Statement in Support Thereof" (hereinafter, Objection to Motion to Augment), pp.15.) Thereafter, the Idaho Supreme Court entered an order denying Ms. Hart's request
for transcripts of the change of plea hearing held on May 26, 2010, and the sentencing
hearing held on July 7, 2010. (Order, Denying Motion to Augment and Suspend the
Briefing Schedule Without Prejudice (hereinafter, Order Denying Motion to Augment),
p.1.)

1

That case is Ada County case number CR 2010-5104.
2

ISSUES
1.

Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Ms. Hart due process and equal protection
when it denied her Motion to Augment with transcripts necessary for review of
the issues on appeal?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed excessively harsh
sentences?

3

ARGUMENT
I.
The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Ms. Hart Due Process And Equal Protection When It
Denied Her Motion To Augment With Transcripts Necessary For Review Of The Issues
On Appeal

A.

Introduction
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that it is a violation of the

Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal protection clauses to deny an indigent
defendant access to transcripts of proceedings which are relevant to issues the
defendant intends to raise on appeal. In the event the record reflects a colorable need
for a transcript, the only way a court can constitutionally preclude an indigent defendant
from obtaining that transcript is if the State can prove that the transcript is irrelevant to
the issues on appeal or if a sufficient substitute for the transcript exists.
In this case, the Idaho Supreme Court denied Ms. Hart's request for transcripts of
the of the change of plea hearing held on May 26, 2010, and the sentencing hearing
held on July 7, 2010. (Order Denying Motion to Augment), p.1.) On appeal, Ms. Hart is
challenging the Idaho Supreme Court's denial of her request for transcripts of those
transcripts. Ms. Hart asserts that the requested transcripts are relevant to the issue of
whether the district court abused its discretion when it imposed excessively harsh
sentences upon revoking probation and the withheld judgment because the applicable
standard of review requires an appellate court to conduct an independent review of the
entirety of the proceedings in order to evaluate the district court's sentencing decisions.
Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court erred in denying her request.

4

B.

The Idaho Supreme Court, By Failing To Provide Ms. Hart With Access To The
Requested Transcripts, Has Denied Her Due Process And Equal Protection
Because She Cannot Obtain A Merits Based Appellate Review Of Her
Sentencing Claims
The constitutions of both the United States and the State of Idaho guarantee a

criminal defendant due process of law. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Idaho Const. art.
I§ 13.
It is firmly established that due process requires notice and a meaningful
opportunity to be heard. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965);
Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948). The Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment also protects against arbitrary and capricious acts
of the government. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). Due
process requires that judicial proceedings be "fundamentally fair."
Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Sec. Serv. of Durham Cty., 452 U.S. 18, 24
(1981 ).
State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425,445 (1991) (overruled on other grounds by State v. Wood,

132 Idaho 88 (1998)).

The Idaho Supreme Court has "applied the United States

Supreme Court's standard for interpreting the due process clause of the United States
Constitution to art. I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution." Maresh v. State, Dept. of
Health and Welfare ex rel. Caballero, 132 Idaho 221, 227 (1998).

In Idaho, a criminal defendant's right to appeal is statutory. See I.C. § 19-2801.
Idaho statutes dictate that if an indigent defendant requests a relevant transcript, the
transcript must be created at county expense. I.C. § 1-1105(2); I.C. § 19-863(a). Idaho
court rules also address this issue. Idaho Criminal Rule 5.2 mandates the production of
transcripts when requested by an indigent defendant.

I.C.R. 5.2(a).

Further,

"[t]ranscripts may be requested of any hearing or proceeding before the court .... " Id.
Idaho Criminal Rule 54. 7 further enables a district court to "order a transcript to be
prepared at county expense if the appellant is exempt from paying such a fee as
provided by statute or law." I.C.R. 54.7(a).
5

An appeal from an order revoking probation is an appeal of right as defined in
Idaho Appellate Rule 11. An order revoking probation is an order "made after judgment
affecting substantial rights of the defendant."

State v. Dryden, 105 Idaho 848, 852

(Ct. App. 1983). Additionally, an appeal from the denial of an Idaho Criminal Rule 35(b)
motion is an appeal as of right as defined by Idaho Appellate Rule 11 (c)(9).

See

State v. Fuller, 104 Idaho 891 (Ct. App. 1983) (holding an order denying a motion for

reduction of sentence under Rule 35 is an appealable order pursuant to then I.AR.
11(c)(6)).
The United States Supreme Court has issued a long line of opinions directly
addressing whether indigent defendants, who have a statutory right to an appeal, can
require the state to pay for an appellate record including verbatim transcripts of the
relevant proceedings. There are two fundamental themes which permeate these cases.
The first theme is that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal protection
clauses are interpreted broadly. Any disparate treatment between indigent defendants
and those with financial means is not tolerated. However, the second theme limits the
states' obligation to provide indigent defendants with a record for review. The states do
not have to provide indigent defendants with everything they request. In order to meet
the constitutional mandates of due process and equal protection, the states must
provide indigent defendants with an appellate record unless some or all of the
requested material are unnecessary or frivolous.
The seminal opinion in this line of cases is Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
In that case, two indigent defendants "filed a motion in the trial court asking that a
certified copy of the entire record, including a stenographic transcript of the
proceedings, be furnished [to] them without cost." Griffin, 351 U.S. at 13. At that time,
6

the State of Illinois provided free transcripts for indigent defendants that had been
sentenced to death, but required defendants in all other criminal cases to purchase
transcripts themselves. Id. at 14. The sole question before the United States Supreme
Court was whether the denial of the requested transcripts to indigent non-death penalty
defendants was a denial of due process and equal protection. Id. at 16.
The Supreme Court initially noted that "[p]roviding equal justice for poor and rich,
weak and powerful alike is an age old problem." Id. "Both equal protection and due
process emphasize the central aim of our entire judicial system-all people charged with
crime must, so far as the law is concerned, 'stand on equal footing before the bar of
justice in every American court."' Id. at 17 (quoting Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227,
241 (1940)). "In criminal trials a State can no more discriminate on account of poverty
than on the account of religion, race, or color." Id. The Supreme Court went on to hold
as follows:
There is no meaningful distinction between a rule which would deny
the poor the right to defend themselves in a trial court and one which
effectively denies the poor an adequate appellate review accorded to all
who have money enough to pay the costs in advance. It is true that a
State is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate
courts or a right to appellate review at all. But that is not to say that a
State that does grant appellate review can do so in a way that
discriminates against some convicted defendants on account of their
poverty. Appellate review has now become an integral part of the Illinois
trial system for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant.
Consequently at all stages of the proceedings the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses protect persons like petitioners from invidious
discriminations.
Id. at 18 (citations omitted). In order to satisfy the constitutional mandates of both due

process and equal protection, an indigent defendant must be provided with a record
which facilitates an effective, merits-related appellate review.

7

At the same time, the

Supreme Court noted that a stenographic transcript is not necessary in instances where
a less expensive, yet accurate, alternative exists. Id. at 20.
In Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959), the Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding
in Griffin when it struck down a requirement that all appeals to the Ohio Supreme Court
be accompanied with a requisite filing fee, regardless of the defendant's indigency. The
United States Supreme Court held that "once the State chooses to establish appellate
review in criminal cases, it may not foreclose indigents from access to any phase of that
procedure because of their poverty." Id. at 257. "This principle is no less applicable
where the State has afforded an indigent defendant access to the first phase of its
appellate procedure but has effectively foreclosed access to the second phase of that
procedure solely because of his indigency." Id.
In Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963), the Supreme Court addressed a
procedure determining whether access to transcripts based on a frivolousness
standard. "Under the present standard, .... they must convince the trial judge that
their contentions of error have merit before they can obtain the free transcript necessary
to prosecute their appeal." Draper, 327 U.S. at 494. The Court first expanded upon its
holding in Griffin, that a stenographic transcript is not required if an equivalent
alternative is available, by adding a relevancy requirement stating that "part or all of the
stenographic transcript in certain cases will not be germane to consideration of the
appeal, and a State will not be required to expend funds unnecessarily in such
circumstances." Id. at 495. The Court went on to discuss the specific issues raised on
appeal by the defendants to decide the relevance of the requested transcripts. The
Court ultimately concluded that the issues raised by the defendants could not be
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adequately reviewed without resorting to the stenographic transcripts of the trial
proceedings. Id. at 497-99.
Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971 ), extended the Griffin protections

to defendants convicted of non-felony offenses, and placed the burden on the State to
prove that the requests for verbatim transcripts are not relevant to the issues raised on
appeal. In doing so, it held "where the grounds of appeal ... make out a colorable need
for a complete transcript, the burden is on the State to show that only a portion of the
transcript or an 'alternative' will suffice for an effective appeal on those grounds. Id at
195.
This authority has been recognized by both the Idaho Supreme Court and the
Idaho Court of Appeals.

See Gardner v. State, 91 Idaho 909 (1967); State v.

Callaghan, 143 Idaho 856 (Ct. App. 2006); State v. Braaten, 144 Idaho 60 (Ct. App.

2007).
If the record establishes that the requested transcripts are relevant to the issues
on appeal, due process and equal protection mandate that those transcripts be created
at the public's expense, unless the State can prove that the requested transcripts are
not relevant to the issues on appeal.

C.

The Requested Transcripts Are Relevant To Ms. Hart's Appeal Because She Is
Challenging The Length Of Her Sentence And The Applicable Standard Of
Review Requires An Appellate Court To Independently Review The Entire
Record Before The District Court
The requested transcripts are necessary for review of the issue raised in this

appeal because they are within an Idaho appellate court's scope of review. According
to the Idaho Supreme Court the "standard of review of a criminal sentence is also wellestablished" and that the "Court conducts an independent review of the entire record
9

available to the trial court at sentencing."

State v. Pierce, 150 Idaho 1, 5-6 (2010).

(emphasis added). This is in accord with the standard employed by the Idaho Court of
Appeals, "When we review a sentence that is ordered into execution following a period
of probation, we will examine the entire record encompassing events before and after
the original judgment. We base our review upon the facts existing when the sentence
was imposed as well as events occurring between the original sentencing and the
revocation of probation."
(emphasis added).

State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 28 (Ct. App. 2009)

In other words, an appellate court reviewing a district court's

sentencing decision conducts an independent review of the entire record to determine if
the record supports the district court's sentencing decisions. This scope of review is
necessary in Idaho because judges are not required to state their sentencing rationale
on the record. State v. Nield, 106 Idaho 665,666 (1984).
In this case, Judge Copsey presided over the final disposition hearing held on
April 3, 2013.

(R., pp.103.)

Judge Copsey also presided over the change of plea

hearing held on May 26, 2010, and the sentencing hearing held on July 7, 2010.
(R., pp.45-46, 50-52.) Since Pierce and Hannington, supra, indicates that an appellate
court will review the entire record before the district court and the Adams Opinion, infra,
indicates that an appellate court will presume Judge Copsey relied on her memory of
those proceedings when executing Ms. Hart's sentences after revoking probation, the
transcripts of those hearings are necessary for an appellate court to review the merits of
her appellate sentencing claims.
The Idaho Court of Appeals has recently issued an opinion in State v. Morgan,
153 Idaho 618 (Ct. App. 2012), which addressed the scope of review of an appeal filed
from an order revoking probation. In that case, the defendant pleaded guilty and was
10

placed on probation. Id. at 619. After a period of probation, the defendant admitted to
violating the terms of his probation and the district court revoked probation, but retained
jurisdiction. Id. at 619-620. The defendant subsequently admitted to violating the terms
of his probation and the district court revoked probation. Id. The defendant appealed
from the district court's second order revoking probation. Id.
On appeal, the defendant filed a motion to augment the appellate record with
transcripts associated with his first probation violation and disposition, which was denied
by the Idaho Supreme Court. Id. The defendant then raised as issues on appeal the
question of whether the Idaho Supreme Court denied him due process and equal
protection when it denied the motion to augment and whether the district court abused
its discretion when it revoked probation. Id. at 620-21. The Idaho Court of Appeals held
that the transcripts of the prior probation proceedings were not necessary for the appeal
because "they were not before the district court in the second probation violation
proceedings, and the district court gave no indication that it based its revocation
decision upon anything that occurred during those proceedings." Id. at 621. The Court
of Appeals then clarified the scope of review for a revocation determination.
Specifically, it held:
[l]n reviewing the propriety of a probation revocation, we will not arbitrarily
confine ourselves to only those facts which arise after sentencing to the
time of the revocation of probation. However, that does not mean that a//
proceedings in the trial court up to and including sentencing are germane.
The focus of the inquiry is the conduct underlying the trial court's decision
to revoke probation. Thus, this Court will consider the elements of the
record before the trial court relevant to the revocation of probation issues
which are properly made part of the record on appeal.
Id. (original emphasis) (citation omitted).

The instant case is distinguishable because Morgan only addressed the order
revoking probation, and here Ms. Hart is challenging the length of her sentence, which
11

entails an analysis of "the entire record encompassing events before and after the
original judgment. We base our review upon the facts existing when the sentence was
imposed as well as events occurring between the original sentencing and the revocation
of probation."2 Hanington, 148 Idaho at 28. Furthermore, whether the transcripts of the
requested proceedings were before the district court at the time of the probation
revocation hearing is not germane to the question of whether the transcripts are
relevant to the issues on appeal because, in reaching a sentencing decision, a district
court is not limited to considering only that information offered at the hearing from which
the appeal was filed. Rather, the court is entitled to utilize knowledge gained from its

In Morgan, the Court of Appeals refused to address Mr. Morgan's claim that the Idaho
Supreme Court denied him due process on the basis that it does not have the power to
overrule a decision by the Idaho Supreme Court. Id. at 621. The Morgan Court went on
to state that it would have the authority to review a renewed motion to augment if it was
filed with the Court of Appeals after the appeal was assigned to the Court of Appeals
and contained information or argument which was not presented to the Idaho Supreme
Court. Id. However, this position is untenable because Idaho Appellate Rule 30
requires that all motions to augment be filed with the Supreme Court. The relevant
portions of I.AR. 30 follow:
2

Any party may move the Supreme Court to augment or delete from the
settled reporter's transcript or clerk's or agency's record.

Unless otherwise expressly ordered by the Supreme Court such motion
shall be determined without oral argument. The reporter's transcript and
clerk's or agency's record may also be augmented or portions deleted by
stipulation of the parties and order of the Supreme Court.
(emphasis added). Therefore, the Morgan Court's statement that Mr. Morgan could
have filed a renewed motion to augment directly with the Court of Appeals is contrary to
the Idaho Appellate Rules. Ms. Hart recognizes that the Idaho Court of Appeals has
recently rejected virtually identical arguments in State v. Cornelison, 2013 Published
Opinion 22 (Ct. App. April 11, 2013). However, Ms. Hart disagrees with the holding in
that case.

12

own official position and observations. See Downing v. State, 136 Idaho 367, 373-74
(Ct. App. 2001 ); see also State v. Sivak, 105 Idaho 900, 907 (1983) (recognizing that
the findings of the trial judge in sentencing are based, in part, upon what the court heard
during trial); State v. Wallace, 98 Idaho 318 (1977) (recognizing that the court could rely
upon "the number of certain types of criminal transactions that [the judge] has observed
in the courts within its judicial district and the quantity of drugs therein involved");
State v. Gibson, 106 Idaho 491 (Ct. App. 1984) (approving sentencing court's reliance

upon evidence presented at the preliminary hearing from a previously dismissed case
because "the judge hardly could be expected to disregard what he already knew about
Gibson from the other case"). Thus, whether the prior hearings were transcribed or not
is irrelevant, because the court may rely upon the information it already knows from
presiding over the prior hearings when it made the sentencing decision after revoking
probation.
The rationale behind this position comports with the Idaho Court of Appeals'
reasoning in State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053, 1055-56 (Ct. App. 1989), where the Court
of Appeals explained why the appellate courts should look to the entire record when
reviewing the executed sentence:
[W]hen we review a sentence ordered into execution after probation has
been revoked, we examine the entire record encompassing events before
and after the original judgment. We adopt this scope of review for two
reasons. First, the district judge, when deciding whether to order execution
of the original sentence or of a reduced sentence, does not artificially
segregate the facts into prejudgment and postjudgment categories. The
judge naturally and quite properly remembers the entire course of events
and considers all relevant facts in reaching a decision. When reviewing
that decision, we should consider the same facts. Second, when a
sentence is suspended and probation is granted, the defendant has scant
reason, and no incentive, to appeal. Only if the probation is later revoked,
and the sentence is ordered into execution, does the issue of an
excessive sentence become genuinely meaningful. Were we to adopt the
state's position that any claim of excessiveness is waived if not made on
13

immediate appeal from the judgment pronouncing but suspending a
sentence, defendants would be forced to file preventive appeals as a
hedge against the risk that probation someday might be revoked. We see
no reason to compel this hollow exercise. Neither do we wish to see the
appellate system cluttered with such cases.
As such, when an appellant files an appeal from a sentence ordered after the revocation
of probation the applicable standard of review requires an independent and
comprehensive inquiry into the events which occurred prior to, as well as the events
which occurred during, the probation revocation proceedings.

The basis for this

standard of review is that the district court "naturally and quite properly remembers the
entire course of events and considers all relevant facts in reaching a decision." Id. It
follows that, "[w]hen reviewing that decision, [an appellate court] should consider the
same facts." Id. The Court of Appeals did not hold that the district court must expressly
reference prior proceedings at the probation disposition hearing in order for this
standard of review to become applicable.
presumed

the judge would

To the contrary, the Court of Appeals

automatically consider prejudgment events when

determining what sentence should be executed after revoking probation. Whether the
prior hearings were transcribed or not, is irrelevant, as an appellate court will presume
that the district court will remember and consider the events from the prior proceedings
when it executes a sentence after revoking probation.
Since the requested transcripts are within the applicable standard of review, the
Idaho Supreme court's decision to deny Ms. Hart access to those transcripts constitutes
a due process and equal protection violation. In Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963), a
transcript was necessary to perfect an appeal and the appeal could be dismissed
without the transcript. Lane, 327 U.S. at 478-81. Similarly, in Idaho, an appellant must
provide an adequate record or face procedural default. "It is well established that an
14

appellant bears the burden to provide an adequate record upon which the appellate
court can review the merits of the claims of error, .... and where pertinent portions of
the record are missing on appeal, they are presumed to support the actions of the trial
court." State v. Coma, 133 Idaho 29, 34 (Ct. App. 1999); see also State v. Beason, 119
Idaho 103, 105 (Ct. App. 1991 ); State v. Murinko, 108 Idaho 872, 873 (Ct. App. 1985).
If the transcripts are missing, but the record contains court minutes that may be
sufficient so that a meaningful review of an appellant's claim is possible, then the
transcripts are not necessary for review even though the Court of Appeals has "strongly
suggest[ed] that appellate counsel not rely on the district court minutes to provide ... [a]
record for [that] Court's review." State v. Murphy, 133 Idaho 489, 491 (Ct. App. 1999).
If Ms. Hart fails to provide the appellate court with transcripts necessary for review of
her claim, the legal presumption will apply and Ms. Hart's sentencing claims will not be
addressed on their actual merits.

If it is state action, combined with Ms. Hart's

indigency, which prevents her from access to the necessary transcripts, then such
action is a violation of the equal protection and due process clauses and any such
presumption should no longer apply.
Moreover, and in light of the denial of the transcripts, the foregoing presumption
should be reversed in this case, and what occurred at those hearings should be
presumed to discredit the district court's final sentencing decision. When Ms. Hart was
first given the opportunity of probation, the district court must have found that the
circumstances were right to give her an opportunity to be a member of society. To
ignore the positive factors that were present at the previous hearings presents a
negative, one-sided view of Ms. Hart. Denial of access to the requested transcripts has
prevented Ms. Hart from addressing those positive factors in support of her appellate
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sentencing claims.

In light of that denial, Ms. Hart argues that the events which

occurred at the subject hearings should be presumed to invalidate the district court's
final sentencing decisions in this matter.
In sum, there is a long line of cases which repeatedly hold it is a violation of both
due process and equal protection to deny an indigent defendant transcripts necessary
for a merits-based review on appeal.

In this case, the requested transcripts are

necessary to address the issues on appeal because the applicable standard of review
of an appellate sentencing claim requires the appellate court to conduct an independent
review of all of the proceedings before the district court. Under this standard of review,
the focus is not entirely on the district court's express sentencing rationale 3 ; to the
contrary, the main question on appeal is if the record itself supports the district court's
ultimate sentencing decision. As such, the decision to deny Ms. Hart's request for the
transcripts will render her appeal meaningless because it will be presumed that the
missing transcripts support the district court's sentencing decisions. This functions as a
procedural bar to the review of Ms. Hart's appellate sentencing claims on the merits
and, therefore, she should either be provided with the requested transcripts or the
presumption should not be applied.

Since Ms. Hart's request for the transcripts was

denied, that presumption should be reversed in her favor.

Both the United States Supreme Court and the Idaho Supreme Court have
consistently held that due process requires trial courts to expressly articulate, on the
record, their rationale for revoking probation in order to facilitate an effective merits
based review of those decisions. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); see also
State v. Chapman, 111 Idaho 152 (1986), supra.
3
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D.

The Idaho Supreme Court, By Failing To Provide Ms. Hart With Access To The
Requested Transcripts, Has Denied Her Due Process Because She Cannot
Obtain Effective Assistance Of Counsel On Appeal
In Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), the United States Supreme Court

relied on Griffin, supra, and its progeny and held that the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment requires the states to provide indigent defendants counsel on
appeal. In Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985), the Court recognized a due process
right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal.

According to the United States

Supreme Court:
In short, the promise of Douglas that a criminal defendant has a right to
counsel on appeal-like the promise of Gideon that a criminal defendant
has a right to counsel at trial would be a futile gesture unless it
comprehended the right to effective assistance of counsel.

Evitts, 469 U.S. at 397.
The remaining issue is defining effective assistance of counsel. According to the
United States Supreme Court,

appellate counsel must make a conscientious

examination of the case and file a brief in support of the best arguments to be made.

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967), held that the constitutional requirements
of substantial equality and fair process "can only be attained where counsel acts as an
active advocate on behalf of his client .... [Counsel's] role as advocate requires that he
supports his client's appeal to the best of his ability." See also Banuelos v. State, 127
Idaho 860, 865 (Ct. App. 1995).

In this case, the lack of access to the requested

transcripts prevented appellate counsel from making a conscientious examination of the
case and has potentially prevented appellate counsel from determining whether there is
an additional issue to raise, or whether there is factual support either in favor of any
argument to be made or undercutting an argument.
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Therefore, Ms. Hart has not

obtained review of the court proceeding based on the merits and was not provided with
effective assistance of counsel in that endeavor.
Furthermore, in State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137 (1989) (overruled on

other grounds by State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425 (1991)), the Idaho Supreme Court held
that the starting point for evaluating whether counsel renders effective assistance of
counsel in a criminal action is the American Bar Association's "Standards For Criminal
Justice, The Defense Function."

These standards offer insight into the role and

responsibilities of appellate counsel. Regarding appellate counsel, the standards state:
Appellate counsel should give a client his or her best professional
evaluation of the questions that might be presented on appeal. Counsel,
when inquiring into the case, should consider all issues that might affect
the validity of the judgment of conviction and sentence . . . . Counsel
should advise on the probable outcome of a challenge to the conviction or
sentence. Counsel should endeavor to persuade the client to abandon a
wholly frivolous appeal or to eliminate contentions lacking substance.
Standards 4-8.3(b). In the absence of access to the requested transcripts, appellate
counsel can neither make a professional evaluation of the questions that might be
presented on appeal, nor consider all issues that might have affected the district court's
sentencing determination at issue. Further, counsel is unable to advise Ms. Hart on the
probable role the transcripts may play in the appeal.
Ms. Hart is entitled to effective assistance of counsel in this appeal, and effective
counsel cannot be given in the absence of access to the relevant transcripts.
Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court has denied Ms. Hart her constitutional rights to due
process and equal protection which include a right to effective assistance of counsel in
this appeal.

Accordingly, appellate counsel should be provided with access to the

requested transcripts and should be allowed the opportunity to provide any necessary
supplemental briefing raising issues or arguments which arise as a result of that review.
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II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed Excessively Harsh Sentences
Ms. Hart asserts that, given any view of the facts, her two consecutive
indeterminate sentences of three years are excessive. Where a defendant contends
that the sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court
will conduct an independent review of the record giving consideration to the nature of
the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest. See

State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, '"[w]here a sentence is within statutory
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of
the court imposing the sentence."'

State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997)

(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Ms. Hart does not allege that her
sentences exceed the statutory maximum.

Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of

discretion, Ms. Hart must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentences were
excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. The governing criteria or objectives of
criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and
the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution
for wrongdoing. Id.
While Ms. Hart was awaiting her probation violation admission/disposition
hearing, she was in the Jefferson County Jail. (PSI, p.768.) At that hearing, Ms. Hart
submitted a letter written by the Jefferson County Jail Lieutenant, which contains the
following information about Ms. Hart:
Ms. Hart has been out facility (Jefferson County Jail) since August
08, 2012 and has been on her best behavior she has not received any
disciplinary reports. She has been a well behaved inmate at our facility I
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have nothing bad to say about her, She is always in good spirits doesn't
complain and does what she is told to do.
Ms. Hart was an inmate worker at our facility from 10/18/2012 to
01/11/2013. She was an excellent worker; the cook was very pleased with
her performance and her ability to follow instructions.
Ms. Hart was pleasant when I spoke with her and had a smile on
her face. I have not heard anything negative about her while she has
been housed here.
(PSI, p.768; Tr., p.9, L.14 - p.10, L.2.) While Ms. Hart was on a period of retained
jurisdiction ("rider"), in an unrelated case4 she also performed well. According to the
IDOC:
[Ms. Hart] comes prepared to class and is engaged in the learning
experience. Ms. Hart shows initiative by assisting newer women in the
program without being asked to do so. Ms. Hart volunteers on a regular
basis and always works hard, completing tasks efficiently and correctly.
She has been a great help.
Ms. Hart has been good at following compound and group rules,
as evidenced by receiving no formal disciplinary sanctions. She has
demonstrated she can follow rules.
Ms. Hart is taking definite, positive steps toward a more pro-social
lifestyle. She seems to be taking her sobriety seriously and is striving to
be a productive member of society. Her attitudes and behaviors have
demonstrated continual growth, as well as a commitment to change.
According to Ms. Hart, she has made many internal changes while
incarcerated. She reported she has gained coping and life skills.
(PSI, p.393.) 5 One of Ms. Hart's IDOC treatment providers stated that "Ms. Hart is one
of the few in the group I look to, to hold the group standard high." (PSI, p.395.)
In addition to the foregoing, there are mitigating factors which support the
conclusion that Ms. Hart does not pose a significant threat to the community. Ms. Hart
was engaging in her illegal activity because her husband had lost his job and they

4

This rider was ordered in Ada County Case CR 2010-5104.
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needed money for basic necessities. (PSI, p.6.) However, Ms. Hart recognizes that
she "got greedy" because she went beyond basic necessities as some of her purchases
were luxury items. (PSI, p.3.) Ms. Hart told the presentence investigator that once her
husband gets a job she will not have any financial problems. (PSI, p.10.) Ms.

Hart is

also in her early twenties and was only nineteen at the time she committed the offense.
(PSI, p.1.) She has no juvenile record. (PSI, p.4.) At the time of sentencing, the series
of events which led to the underlying conviction in this case and in Ada County Case
CR 2010-5401, were the only criminal offenses Ms. Hart had committed. (PSI, p.4.)
In sum, Ms. Hart is young and her offenses were financially motivated.
However, whenever she is in a treatment based environment she excels. With the
treatment she has already received, she will probably not have a difficult time
becoming a productive member of society.

As such, the district court abused its

discretion when it imposed excessively harsh sentences as the consecutive nature of
those sentences will potentially keep Ms. Hart imprisoned when she poses little threat
to society and should be gaining employment experience in the community.

An updated presentence investigation was not created in this case and both parties
and the district court all agreed to rely on the presentence materials created for both this
case and those in Ada County Case CR 2010-5104. (Tr., p.7, L.2 - p.8, L.16.)
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CONCLUSION
Ms. Hart respectfully requests access to the requested transcripts and the
opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising issues or arguments
which arise as a result of that review.

In the event request is denied, Ms. Hart

respectfully requests this Court orders her sentences in this case and Ada County Case
CR 2010-5401 run concurrently.
DATED this 29th day of October, 2013.

SHAWN F. WILKERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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